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The purpose of this paper is to explore how sales compensation disclosure, salespeople’s perception of corporate social responsibility (CSR) toward customers (i.e. customer-focused CSR), regulatory knowledge and coworkers’ ethical behavior may influence life insurance salespeople’s moral intensity and intentions to engage in misleading sales behaviors.

The hypotheses are analyzed using partial least squares (PLS) regression with the data gathered from full-time life insurance salespeople in Taiwan.

The main findings indicate that disclosing sales compensations will alter the ethical decision-making process of life insurance salespeople. The findings further point out that customer-focused CSR is an important variable affecting moral intensity and ethical intentions.

There has not been any research on the effects of compensation disclosure on moral intensity and misleading sales behavior. The literature gap has led to a poor understanding of the relationship between the compensation disclosure policy and ethical sales behavior. Moreover, previous studies indicate that specific factors (such as moral intensity and ethical intention) are directly associated, while the research shows that as long as a regulatory policy (e.g. the policy of compensation disclosure) changes, the correlation between these variables may shift from significant to nonsignificant (or vice versa). The results are interesting enough to warrant more research, and they also show that the direct link between variables mentioned in previous research is not always stable or universal.

This case study aim to investigate the impacts of insurance agents’ positive attitude toward inappropriate product recommendations on the insurance agents’ intention to make the inappropriate product recommendations. This study further checks how the attitude and intention could be enhanced by the insurer’s manipulation of sales compensations, the agents’ perception of information asymmetry between customers and insurance agents and the insurer’s sales orientation.

Full-time insurance agents from the life insurance industry in Taiwan were surveyed. To test the hypotheses, hierarchical regression analyses were used in the study.

The main results showed that the respondents’ positive attitude toward inappropriate product recommendations was the influential predictor of the respondents’ behavioral intention. Nevertheless, the positive attitude was enhanced by the manipulation of sales compensations and the insurer’s sales orientation.

Very few studies have investigated the relationships among information asymmetry between customers and agents, management’s sales orientation, management’s manipulation of sales compensations and the problems of selling unsuitable insurance products to customers. This study may contribute to the relevant literature by discussing these issues.

Prior research showed that sexual harassment by customers is a widespread and serious problem for service workers. However, some of the service workers may be unwilling to report this problem to their managers because customers are important for them and for the interests of the organization. Moreover, reporting customer sexual harassment could be embarrassing and may prompt retaliation against those service workers. The purpose of this paper is to focus on salespeople’s intention to report customer sexual harassment to their immediate managers, and how the whistle-blowing intention is affected by the salespeople’s perception of anti-harassment policy, manager integrity and risks of blowing the whistle.

To test the relationships among the variables, the data acquisition procedure yielded the responses of 251 full-time life insurance salespeople in Taiwan.

The findings showed that salesperson perception of anti-harassment policy and manager integrity were positively associated with the salespeople’s whistle-blowing intention. Gender, age and personal experience of being sexually harassed by customers also related to the whistle-blowing intention.

Customer sexual harassment has seldom been discussed in the relevant literature. The potential impacts of manager integrity on the prevention of customer sexual harassment in service work have also been less mentioned.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impacts of loss-premium comparisons (loss-premium comparison refers to the amount of an actual loss compared to the premium level) and insurance coverage on customer acceptance of insurance claim frauds, based on Adams’ equity theory. Customer perceptions of insurance frauds have been studied in recent years.

A questionnaire was used as an instrument in the research. The hypotheses were tested using a 3 loss-premium comparisons (the actual loss amount was lower than, or equal to or higher than the annual premium) × 2 insurance coverage (the loss is covered or not covered by the insurance policy) experimental design in a claim application context.

The results showed that loss-premium comparisons and insurance coverage significantly affect the final claim amounts. According to the results, age and education may relate to customer acceptance of insurance claim frauds.

This study proposed a first empirical investigation into the relationship between loss-premium comparisons and customer ethical decision making in the customer frauds. Insurance coverage is also specifically considered in the study.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impacts of the size and timing of sales compensations, the management stringency of the insurer and the insurance broker's own moral views on product recommendations made by the brokers.

The data used in this research were gathered from life insurance broker companies in Taiwan.

The results showed that the sales compensations, perceived leniency of the insurer's underwriting and claim policy would affect the product recommendations made by the brokers.

Insurance brokers are one of the most important marketing channels in the insurance industry. However, using the insurance brokers to sell insurance may result in some ethical problems. For example, some insurance brokers may sell insurance to high-risk customers because the high-risk customers may prefer to buy more insurance and that means more sales compensations can be earned. The findings of this research may have some implications for insurance management and insurance regulation.

This study contributes to the understanding of insurance brokers' responses to adverse selection problems (high-risk customers may prefer to buy more insurance) and product recommendation decisions. The issue has been less mentioned in the financial regulation literature.